"A thousand friends and zero enemies": Indonesia reflects on BRICS

A year and a half of Indonesian membership in BRICS has not brought anything fundamentally new in terms of understanding Indonesia’s foreign policy interests and priorities. Jakarta’s participation in the grouping itself has so far not produced any practical results, but it has also not become a burden. At first glance, such a situation may raise the question of why Indonesia joined BRICS at all, since the country’s membership, like BRICS as a whole, has not yet been marked by major trade agreements or breakthrough investment and infrastructure projects. There has been no noticeable increase in Indonesia’s political weight within BRICS either. There is also no clear picture of what BRICS should or could become in ten years.

However, such a framing of the question is largely meaningless, as it rests on a flawed analysis of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Today, among Indonesian experts and even officials, one can increasingly hear a provocative phrase: "Indonesia has no foreign policy, only Prabowo’s foreign policy." Despite its sharpness, there is a considerable degree of truth in this statement. Since Prabowo Subianto came to power, the country’s foreign policy process has indeed become significantly more personalized. The importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a number of sectoral agencies has diminished, and many of their functions are increasingly reduced to providing protocol-level support for decisions made at the highest level. Indonesian diplomacy is gradually becoming an extension of Prabowo’s own political style—pragmatic, flexible, at times impulsive, and primarily focused on maximizing room for maneuver.

The pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy, or what is called in Indonesia "bebas aktif" (free and active policy), is the foundation of Prabowo’s foreign policy course. In practice, this is reflected in Indonesia’s ability to simultaneously conduct military exercises with Russia, join BRICS, and speak about the need to reform the UN, the IMF, and all Western institutions, and then negotiate with Washington on tariff reductions, as well as join the Gaza Peace Council—questionable even from Indonesia’s own perspective. From the outside, such a policy often appears contradictory and even chaotic, and it frequently faces criticism domestically. But this is precisely the nature of Prabowo’s “free and active” policy.

In this sense, BRICS has proven to be an extremely convenient platform for Jakarta. Prabowo does not perceive the grouping as an anti-Western bloc—such logic is alien to Indonesian political culture. Rather, BRICS is seen as an alternative to the Western-centric system of global governance and a symbol that the world is slowly but surely moving toward multipolarity.

It is noteworthy that Indonesia’s participation in BRICS does not prevent Jakarta from simultaneously seeking membership in the OECD. Moreover, negotiations with the OECD today often generate greater interest in Indonesia than BRICS activities themselves. For many members of the Indonesian elite, OECD integration is viewed as a real tool for economic modernization, increased investment attractiveness, and institutional development.

At the same time, another important aspect cannot be ignored. Prabowo has repeatedly emphasized that one of the key directions of his foreign policy will be strengthening cooperation within the Global South. Indonesia here occupies a special position compared to many of its Southeast Asian neighbors. While most countries in the region prefer to associate themselves with the Global South, Jakarta increasingly openly claims the role of one of its main and most vocal “voices.” In this regard, BRICS fits well into Indonesia’s foreign policy logic—as perhaps the key platform representing the interests of the Global South and what the Global South represents, with all its advantages and limitations.

However, a key question arises here: to what extent can BRICS itself become an effective mechanism for advancing the interests of Global South countries? There is no consensus on this among Indonesian experts.

The economic dimension of Indonesia’s participation in BRICS also requires a very cautious assessment. In recent years, a large number of inflated expectations and openly speculative arguments have formed around the economic potential of the grouping—especially regarding de-dollarization and the creation of an alternative financial infrastructure.

For Indonesia, such rhetoric remains more symbolic than a practical strategy. Indonesian political elites and the expert community assume that BRICS does not directly create any preferential conditions for the country’s trade with other partners. Rather, BRICS is seen as an additional diplomatic channel—a space where contacts can be established, communication built, and potential projects discussed, which are then implemented in a bilateral format. It is bilateral relations, rather than BRICS mechanisms themselves, that remain Indonesia’s key instrument of economic diplomacy, and this is unlikely to change fundamentally in the future.

The same applies to discussions about de-dollarization. Indonesia is interested in strengthening financial sovereignty and expanding the use of national currencies in settlements with major partners. In particular, Indonesia is actively lobbying its QRIS digital payment system, which Jakarta is gradually trying to turn into an exportable element of its digital economy. In practice, Jakarta is already working in this direction, again on a bilateral basis, with China, India, Thailand, and other countries. The infrastructure required for broader initiatives under the BRICS framework simply does not yet exist.

A more promising direction for Indonesia may be cooperation with the New Development Bank (NDB) of BRICS. This is where the greatest potential practical value of Jakarta’s participation in the grouping lies. Indonesia needs foreign capital to implement its socio-economic development goals—from ensuring food and energy security, which is particularly relevant amid the crisis in the Middle East, to building the new capital Nusantara. However, this topic is still relatively rare in public Indonesian discussions about BRICS. Perhaps this is because Jakarta itself is not yet fully sure how effectively the New Development Bank can compete with existing international institutions and provide the country with real financial opportunities.

On balance, Indonesia’s attitude toward BRICS today can be described as cautiously neutral. There is no euphoria or open admiration, but also no sharp criticism or attempts at sabotage. The lack of a coherent understanding of the grouping at both official and expert levels largely results in the absence of strong expectations toward BRICS from Jakarta. Under the current foreign policy course of Prabowo, Indonesia will likely continue to use BRICS as one of many options for projecting its foreign policy philosophy—rejection of bloc thinking, a desire to maintain relations with all centers of power, and the promotion of the concept of "a thousand friends and zero enemies." That is why the main value of BRICS for Indonesia today lies in investment in its global status and membership in a prestigious, albeit not fully understood, club of enthusiasts of a multipolar world.