Why the BRICS Summit in New Delhi Is Important for the Brazilian Agribusiness Sector

With the Brazilian election campaign now entering its climax, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was unable to attend the BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026. The intense electoral race requires daily personal involvement of the president, who is seeking reelection for another term. Nevertheless, the country was represented at the summit by Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, and the meeting was closely monitored by representatives of both the executive branch and major national agribusinesses.

The latest escalation of tensions in the Middle East has disrupted logistics routes, driven up hydrocarbon prices, and is affecting agricultural procurement (from which Brazil derives up to 48.5% of its export revenue, with China and India serving as its key buyers). Overall, according to various estimates, BRICS accounts for between 42% and 50% of global agricultural production (and at least 15% of global exports).

One of the topics of discussion was the mechanism for international payments among BRICS members. Once the BRICS Pay system is fully launched, Brazilian producers of soybeans, sugar, and meat will be able to streamline the delivery of their products to buyers. The stakes are enormous for the only full-fledged Latin American member of BRICS—the volume of agricultural exports to BRICS countries amounts to at least $80 billion (representing 40% to 50% of Brazil’s total agricultural exports). At the 2025 BRICS summit in Brazil, the bloc’s members pledged to boost agribusiness exports, promote food security, and expand the use of electronic certification for goods. The Rio de Janeiro Declaration adopted at that time contains a commitment to ensure the uninterrupted supply of all resources critical to the development of agribusiness.

For Brazil, this served as a signal of support for its role as a supplier of agricultural products to the group’s member countries.

South Americans are deeply concerned about the current situation in the fertilizer market. Several years ago, during the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro, they managed to secure an agreement from the White House not to include mineral fertilizers on the list of Russian goods subject to sanctions (Brazilians purchase a total of $15–16 billion worth of fertilizers, and these imports account for almost the entire volume of their agricultural exports from soybeans and cotton to coffee and sugar). Russia accounts for 20–24% of the necessary supplies (45% for potash fertilizers!), China for more than 20%, and countries in the Middle East for nearly 15% (at least 22% for nitrogen fertilizers). In 2024–2025, Brazil intensified negotiations to increase supplies from two BRICS partner countries—Kazakhstan and Belarus. The South American country has high hopes for the Indonesian market, which became a full-fledged member of BRICS in January 2025.

The conflict in the Middle East and logistical constraints in the Strait of Hormuz (through which 60% of global sulfur trade passes) have dealt a severe blow to this market. There has been a reduction in urea shipments, as well as natural gas transportation problems (which is essential for the production of such fertilizers). The situation was further exacerbated by China’s actions: it suspended exports of certain binary phosphate fertilizers to the Brazilian market in 2026. The exact damage to the Brazilian economy has yet to be assessed, however, in the first half of the year alone Brazil imported 8–10% less fertilizer than during the same period last year. This directly affected fertilizer prices (a 33% increase) and drove up the production costs of Brazilian soybeans, corn, rice, and wheat. Profitability, on the other hand, declined.

The president himself had to step in to resolve this key issue; he actively promoted Bill No. 15,946 in Congress to establish Nova Indústria Brasil (the National Fertilizer Industry Development Program) and succeeded in getting it passed.

Nitrogen fertilizer plants in Bahia and Sergipe ramped up operations in early 2026, followed by an increase in urea production in Paraná (together, they will be able to meet up to 20% of demand). Brazilian authorities plan to reduce dependence on fertilizer imports by 50% by 2050. This was explicitly stated by Marcio Elias Rosa, Minister of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade. The Brazilian government also hopes to find more reliable supply routes for these products (though there is no talk of changing suppliers). Critics, however, remain skeptical about the program, or, more precisely, about its feasibility in the coming years.

Brazilian soybeans have found themselves at the center of the turbulent Sino-American trade negotiations and disputes: China purchases nearly 70% of its required volume from Brazil (worth $34.5 billion). During the seasonal decline in shipments from South America, Chinese imports from the U.S. rise. These fluctuations are nothing new to the Brazilians and previously posed no threat, as South American products are more competitive because private Chinese buyers do not have to pay a 10 percent tariff. However, Beijing is now eager to secure further discounts given the enormous volume of its purchases. The Brazilians have some good reasons to fear that the Chinese and Americans might reach an agreement behind their backs, despite all the ties between China and Brazil within BRICS and at the bilateral level. Both the country’s delegation at the BRICS summit in India and Brazilian farmers surely welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s proposals to create a number of special economic zones and more stable supply chains. For Latin America (and Brazil is no exception), issues of logistics, financing, and specific terms for food trade are far more important than geopolitical debates.

Against this backdrop, the Brazilian delegation actively discussed with representatives of the host country related to expanding agricultural exports issues both on the eve of the BRICS summit and during the event itself. While in the first quarter of 2026, China purchased $11.3 billion worth of Brazilian products (which is more or less comparable to the last year’s figures), India made a significant leap, purchasing $908 million worth of agribusiness products and raw materials from Brazil. It increased its purchases of soybeans, soybean oil, beans, and sesame from the South American country by nearly 80 percent, and consultations regarding new shipments of fruit and cotton are also underway. Brazilian goods are intended to compensate for the shortfall in sugarcane, legumes, and corn not produced in India itself this year due to adverse weather conditions. Hoping to curb prices that have risen sharply amid the shortage, New Delhi has approved the duty-free import of up to 1 million metric tons of Brazilian sugar. The Chinese market remains the largest, but the threat of Chinese phytosanitary restrictions, other non-tariff barriers, and unilateral trade decisions by Beijing persists. Consequently, it is extremely important for Brazil to diversify its trade ties and develop relations with other countries (India, Southeast Asian nations, the Middle East, the U.S., and the EU). This diversification is becoming a key factor in the stability of the country’s agricultural sector.

During the discussions in New Delhi, ideas about what could be potentially implemented were raised: the development of internal trade mechanisms within BRICS, including the concept of a BRICS grain exchange.

At the 16th BRICS Agriculture Ministers’ Meeting, held in Indore, an agreement was reached to establish a joint, farmer-focused BRICS Agri-Network (Network of Agricultural Resources, Genetic Resources, and Information), which will help to share relevant national, regional, and international practices. The bloc’s member countries also set their sights on creating a BRICS Network of Centers of Excellence in agroecology and regenerative agriculture to enhance resilience to climate change and boost productivity, and that is a particularly pressing issue for Brazil. All of this opens up new sales channels for Brazilian agribusiness and allows it to participate more actively in shaping the common rules of the game.

Brazilian agribusiness has been long firmly focused on trade with key BRICS members—China, Russia, and India. For trade between Brazil and India, Brazil and China, and Brazil and Russia, the issue of settlements and the possibility of partially moving away from the dollar as a means of payment remains important. The BRICS initiative on cross-border payments aims to reduce the cost and simplify the process of transfers, as well as to increase the share of settlements in national currencies. Meanwhile, even after the partial launch of BRICS Pay, the group’s members still need to implement a number of technological solutions. Both India and Brazil are unsure about the need to accelerate financial integration with China (even though China is the South American country’s largest trading partner!), and there are no direct financial ties between the UAE and Iran within the bloc. The Brazilians, who have consistently rejected plans to create a single currency or a bloc-wide cryptocurrency, have taken a keen interest in India’s plans for the possible future integration of the central bank digital currencies of BRICS members to simplify international payments. Brazil confirmed its participation in the BRICS Pay roadmap, which involves integrating its Pix instant payment system into the system for settlements in national currencies.

Some good news on this front would certainly be welcomed by Lula’s government ahead of the elections. Meanwhile, the Brazilian agribusiness sector, which has been waiting years for these improvements, fully understands that it will take quite some time for positive news to transform into reality and remains skeptical about promises to integrate Pix with BRICS Pay. Declarations about the upcoming simplification of the payment system have been made for several years now, but Brazilian agribusiness has had to deal with the payment problem on its own all this time.